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Introduction
Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the "renationalisation of European politics." Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: "If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?" He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states. 1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.
(*) The authors are, respectively, Principal Legal Advisor and Trainee in the Legal Service of the European Commission. Katharina Eisele is also a PhD candidate at Maastricht University. The opinions expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission. The article is based on Ben Smulders' contribution to the conference "The Institutional System of the Union Two Years after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty: Towards a New Balance?" organised at the College of Europe on 21 November 2011 in Bruges, Belgium. 1 Herman van Rompuy, "Non pas renationalisation de la politique européenne, mais européisation de la politique nationale", speech delivered in Paris on 20 September 2010, p. 2.
Keeping a Balance: The Union's Institutional System
The EU is an entity of a sui generis nature, to which its Member States have transferred powers with the aim of creating an economic and political Union. The way these powers are divided between and exercised by the Union institutions has for long occupied the minds of policy makers, academics and civil society alike. In 2001, at the Laeken summit, the European Council highlighted the democratic challenge the EU was faced with and the ensuing need to redefine its institutional balance on the eve of enlargement process which would virtually double the number of its members. 2 The European Council made clear that the EU's legitimacy was based on its democratic values, its objectives, the powers it holds and the instruments it had at its disposal -as well as its democratic, transparent and efficient institutions. At the same time, however, it pointed out that the democratic legitimacy and transparency of three of its institutions, the Council, the Parliament and the Commission, needed to be reinforced, and the question was raised how the balance and reciprocal control between the institutions could best be ensured. 3 Almost a decade later and despite European Council claims to be the de facto executive -or at least the "policysteering" power. 6 It has been asserted, however, that the image of an institution changes depending on which aspect is in the focus of interest, in other words, it is decisive whether one endeavours to evaluate for instance the effectiveness or the accountability that an institution displays. 7 In light of this rationale it has been contended that it is difficult to pinpoint a clear notion of institutional balance within the Union's political system, and that "the phrase 'institutional balance' is favoured by practitioners but absent from the academic commentary, which recognises more explicitly the absence of clear institutional design in the EU." 8 Against this background, the authors take the view that it is more useful to define the concept of institutional balance as the legal principle according to which the EU institutions have to act within the limits of their respective powers as provided for by the Treaty. 9 In this regard, it has been highlighted that the Court has used the latter principle as a substitute for the principle of separation of powers, which is concerned with the protection of individuals against the abuse of power in the reasoning of Montesquieu. 10 As opposed to this, the principle of institutional balance as legal principle, to which the Court of Justice referred for the first time in Meroni in 1958, entails that it is upheld as long as every institution does not exceed its respective powers to the detriment of others. 11 This appreciation of institutional balance is thus essentially normative and concerned with the extent and the limitations of the competences of each institution as defined by the Treaties; Article 13 (2) TEU confirms this explicitly under the Lisbon regime. As a result, the objective of keeping an institutional balance among the Union institutions very much depends on how the decision-making within the EU takes place, which in turn depends on which powers are allocated to each EU institution.
The Community Method and its Limits: Time for the Union Method?
The Community method has played a key role in the development of the Union as it stands today. In 2007, in light of the non-adoption of the EU Constitution, the Treaty of Lisbon has been labelled as the "return" to the Community method and has extended the said procedure to all important policy areas, including trade policy, agriculture and fisheries, and in the area of freedom, security and justice. 12 The notion of "return" does, however, not adequately reflect the current state of play.
Rather, the legal framework under the Treaty of Lisbon has reinforced the application of the Community method for a considerable number of policy fields, and has thereby contributed to achieving a new institutional balance in the Union. These constituent elements shall ensure coherent and efficient action in a Union of 27, which is in addition based on strengthened democratic legitimacy. The
Commission's right of initiative, as well as the role that the latter institution takes from beginning to end in each decision-making process aims to guarantee coherence and the consideration of various interests. Finally, it is to be welcomed that the Community method renders the legislative procedure on Union level more democratic and legitimate by integrating all EU organs.
The question arises how to proceed in cases in which the Community method reaches its limits. It was Chancellor Merkel who first came up with the so-called "Union method" stressing that a common position is pivotal for a Europe of the citizens. In her view the Union method implied coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity at European level, in the area of one's competence but all working towards the same goal. 19 The President of the European Commission pointed out that the Union method "was seen as a way to weave together the intergovernmental and supranational elements of our decision-making process", and opined that "[A]lthough this has been interpreted as an attempt to construct a new approach, I believe that 
Grey Areas
The new institutional framework displays, however, also weak points that can generate tensions among various stakeholders. This section outlines some controversial aspects that concern the implementation of principle of institutional 
The Interplay of National Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice
The interaction between the national courts of the Member States and the Court of Justice has in the past triggered heated debates about the principle of supremacy of Union law and constitutional pluralism. Before discussing current developments concerning the relationship between the aforementioned judicial actors in the Union, which all -some to a greater extent than others -postulate claims to power as ultimate arbiter, several general remarks on the theory of constitutional pluralism seem appropriate.
Constitutional Pluralism in the Spotlight
Constitutional pluralism has become a fashionable subject of research as apparent Ladenburger, FIDE 2012 - will incite more national constitutional courts to ask the highest judicial authority in the EU for interpretative guidance. Yet, de facto some current developments seem to suggest the opposite.
A Relationship of Cooperation?
The relationship between the Member States' constitutional courts and the Court of Interestingly enough, the German constitutional court defined in the Maastricht judgment the exercise of its jurisdiction on the application of secondary Community law as a "relationship of cooperation" in respect to the Court of Justice -as mentioned by Voßkuhle. It is therefore not a tug-of-war but cooperation that is today -maybe more than ever -necessary and desirable. What matters is that the democratic basics of the Union are extended inline with the integration and that a vivid democracy is maintained in the integration process within the Member States.
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This much-cited "relationship of cooperation" forms also the basis of a recent decision of the constitutional court of Austria. out that the EU Charter must be regarded in the same way as the Austrian constitution in procedures in which Union law is of relevance. With regard to two principles of Union law, the principle of effectiveness and the principle of equivalence, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights must be used as the standard of scrutiny by the judges of the constitutional court. As a consequence, fundamental rights that are protected by the EU Charter are also constitutionally protected rights that can be claimed before the constitutional court. If, in the context of legal proceedings, the constitutional court is of the opinion that a law is in violation with the EU Charter, the Court will repeal the law in question. The Austrian constitutional court stresses in this regard that it will take this step without prior consultation with the Court of Justice only if the underlying subject-matter is unequivocal. In case the constitutional court has doubts concerning the interpretation of the EU Charter, the court will ask the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling to clarify the issue at hand.
Concluding Remarks
As this contribution has demonstrated the 'checks and balances' of the Union's legal dialogue of great importance. There is hope that other constitutional courts in the EU will learn a lesson from this initiative despite the recent opposing developments that have shaped the debates on the Union's constitutional order. The issue as to how a genuine institutional balance of the EU can be attained that entails a more efficient, transparent and democratic course of action of the Union should in any event be solved constructively.
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